President Bush has called for an International Conference on Palestinian issues this fall, presumably in mid November. This is the latest effort to revive a process that has been moribund throughout his term in office. The following factors have all contributed to Washington's reticence in this decade to become seriously engaged in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations: a reduced American interest in engaging in negotiations after the disappointments of President Clinton's last few months and the results of 9/11; the violence inflicted on Israel during the second intifada; crises elsewhere in the region in Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon; and a general administration disinclination to active diplomacy. However, a number of developments have recently contributed to an altered perspective, most dramatic of which is the Hamas takeover of Gaza in June. Hamas' sudden military victory places an unfettered militant Islamic fundamentalist group supported by Iran at Israel's gate and the West's edge.

Five years ago, President Bush laid out a vision of two states – Israel and Palestine – living in peace and security. He was the first President to do so officially. The vision was concretized in the establishment of the Quartet (the US, UN, U, and Russia), formalizing an international body for the first time to deal exclusively with the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. The release of a "roadmap" for peace followed the next year. Unfortunately, in a consistent pattern, dramatic announcements and actions have been followed by a policy of benign neglect toward Israelis and Palestinians, punctured occasionally by a visit by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Jerusalem and Ramallah, or of an Israeli prime minister to Washington.

As events have demonstrated many times since the President's original speech in June 2002, without decisive American leadership the situation in the region only gets worse. For example, it wasn’t enough just to push for the creation of a Palestinian Prime Minister as a partial alternative to Arafat; he had to be supported after he was appointed. The failure of that policy was demonstrated all too clearly in the summer of 2002 when Arafat managed to overthrow his first Prime Minister, the same Abu Mazen who succeeded him as President of the Palestinian Authority after his death.

Along the way the administration has missed many opportunities: the Saudi peace plan (accepted in large measure by the Arab League in 2002; reiterated in 2007); the Syrian President’s announced interest in talking with Israel; the death of Arafat and election of Abu Mazen in early 2005; and the disengagement of Israel from Gaza later that year which was not used as an opportunity to arrange a cover agreement between the Israelis and Abu Mazen. This policy meant that there was no agreed framework of Palestinian responsibilites for Gaza and the Palestinian people tended to credit Hamas instead of Fatah for the Israeli withdrawal, a situation that helped to facilitate the Hamas election victory the following January. Indeed it was the Bush administration which pressured for these elections over the objections of both the Israelis and the Palestinian Authority.

Somehow nothing comparable to the Hamas military victory has ignited the administration’s interest in Arab-Israeli affairs. It’s not only the calling of an international conference, but since the Hamas takeover of Gaza, the assumption has reigned that a tranquil and successful West Bank would serve as a magnet that would bring Gaza back. That idea sounds fine in theory, but dramatic steps need to be taken as well, and initial efforts have been made. Israel has begun returning tax revenue it collects for the Palestinians for the first time since Hamas was elected, and a small number of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli custody have been returned, both measures designed to strengthen Abu Mazen. Most important, however, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian President Abu Mazen have begun meeting with increasing frequency with the intent of developing a Declaration of Principles for an Israeli-Palestinian agreement that could potentially serve as a productive basis for an international conference. Many are hoping that the Declaration will be promising enough that it will coax Saudi Arabia into attending and that step would in turn draw more Arab states into the conference, which will now apparently be held in the week before Thanksgiving.

If the plan proceeds as its proponents hope, the Conference will be well-attended by parties in and out of the region, and it will provide impetus for intensified and practical talks between Olmert and Abbas, and presumably their teams. But there are also great dangers in this approach if there are no immediate and specific additional follow-up steps such as serious Palestinian efforts for once to control terrorism with the aid of the international community and Lt.-General Keith Dayton (the US security coordinator who is working with the Palestinians on the ground). There will also have to be increased international efforts led by former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, now the Quartet’s Mideast envoy, to aid the Palestinians economically on the West Bank (and eventually in Gaza if political conditions allow). And, specific additional Israeli steps will be necessary such as more Palestinian prisoners released and checkpoints reduced and reconfigured where security conditions permit.

The new process will also be in jeopardy if the Declaration of Principles do not lead, and soon, to further progress such as agreement on a provisional Palestinian state, or agreement on specific borders for a future Palestinian state, or however unlikely agreement—even tentative—on some other key issue such as refugees or Jerusalem.

An international conference is an inherently risky proposition. The Olmert/Abbas Declaration might be feeble and unimpressive; few if any Arab states might attend; the conference could collapse, actually increasing tensions; and potential spoilers such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad backed by Iran and Syria are already moving to make sure it fails by intensifying rocket attacks against Israel and attempting suicide attacks. These efforts will likely increase as the time for the Conference approaches.

Even more worrisome, perhaps, Bush, Olmert, and Abbas have each failed in the past to produce any major achievements on the diplomatic scene, and each—especially Olmert and Abbas—are inhibited by weak domestic positions at home. Yet, here there is a ray of hope. All three desperately need a diplomatic victory to shore up their weak position at home—Bush against his many domestic and foreign critics; Olmert against his chief rivals, Netanyahu and Barak; and Abbas against Hamas. For all three a successful international conference would be a major victory in broadening their options and enhancing their prospects for further achievement.

The key question now is whether after years of failure, passivity, and weak policies the Bush Administration can pull off a major victory. Will it be able to convince a variety of Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, to attend? Will it do the careful planning to assure a successful meeting and a strong path to follow-up so that the new process will not break down quickly? Most important, will it be able to quietly encourage Olmert and Abbas to conclude a strong enough Declaration that the meeting to endorse it occurs at all?

When Bush made his speech advocating a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in June 2002, the United States had not yet invaded Iraq. It is testimony to the failure of that policy that during the five ensuing years, Palestine and its environs have become a microcosm of the larger region's instability and violence. It is time for a new strategy that might work; the old one has certainly failed. The international conference that the US is currently promoting offers a ray of hope that the Bush Administration has finally seen the way and developed the will to move a new process of Israeli-Palestinian accommodation forward, with all the challenges that represents. The November gathering will give us our first idea of whether the administration is indeed up to the task.

Steven Spiegel is Director of the Center for Middle East Development (CMED) and Professor of Political Science at UCLA; Chair of the Center for Israel Studies at AJU, and national scholar of Israel Policy Forum.